Managerial ownership and corporate diversification: a longitudinal view

Strategy and finance research suggests that managerial ownership results in increased incentive alignment and therefore is negatively related to corporate diversification. Using a longitudinal approach, we develop arguments to examine whether managerial ownership is associated with subsequent changes in diversification and/or if diversification is associated with subsequent changes in ownership. The results indicate that levels of managerial ownership in one time period are not associated with subsequent changes in corporate diversification, which raises incentive alignment questions. We also find that higher levels of corporate diversification are associated with changes in managerial ownership, which suggests support for the employment risk‐reduction perspective. This study provides important reasons to reassess the longitudinal implications of the managerial ownership‐corporate diversification link from both theoretical and managerial perspectives. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dynamics of the Market for Medical Malpractice Insurance

Public attention has been directed recently at the market for medical malpractice insurance, yet disagreement persists over whether this market has changed and, if so, what has caused this change. In this study, we examine factors that affect the market for this insurance, including the growth in premiums, losses, and investment earnings, and loss variability. Our analysis suggests that there was significant deterioration in the market for medical malpractice insurance beginning in 1998 and culminating in 2001. We conclude that insurers' losses are the primary driver of the market deterioration during the period 1998 through 2003.     

The influence of executive cognition on competitive dynamics

Prior competitive dynamics research has drawn on theories of information processing to model the subjective antecedents of executives' retaliation choices. This prior work has made great progress in developing our understanding of the retaliation choices most firms will make to a given type of attack. What the information processing perspective has not been able to do is explain firm‐specific behavior to predict which competitive moves individual firms will challenge, or explain why individual firms differ in the types of actions that they are most likely to challenge. The goal of this paper is to sharpen the theoretical and empirical focus on predicting firm‐level retaliation proclivities. We leverage managerial cognition research to examine the relationship between firm‐level differences in the cognitive frameworks that executives possess, and firm‐level differences in whether and how quickly firms challenge a market move. Results from a longitudinal study of the airline industry suggest that the addition of a cognitive perspective provides important insights into competitive retaliation. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Deregulation and Risk

The recent market turmoil has brought attention to how deregulation of the financial sector may affect risk. The purpose of our study is to examine the market's perception of risk associated with deregulation. We accomplish this by decomposing security risk around deregulation into systematic and unsystematic risk. We examine deregulation of several industries and find a consistent pattern of risk adjustment to deregulation, whereby the increase in security risk is temporary and largely unsystematic.     

Moral Hazard in Reinsurance Markets

This article attempts to identify moral hazard in the traditional reinsurance market. We build a multiperiod principal–agent model of the reinsurance transaction from which we derive predictions on premium design, monitoring, loss control, and insurer risk retention. We then use panel data on U.S. property liability reinsurance to test the model. The empirical results are consistent with the model's predictions. In particular, we find evidence for the use of loss‐sensitive premiums when the insurer and reinsurer are not affiliates (i.e., not part of the same financial group), but little or no use of monitoring. In contrast, we find evidence for the extensive use of monitoring when the insurer and reinsurer are affiliates, where monitoring costs are lower.     

Two-Stage Acquisitions, Free-Riding, and Corporate Control

This study examines two-stage acquisitions, focusing upon first- and second-stage excess returns for both acquired and acquiring firms, and analyzing the relation between acquisition returns and ownership interest. The evidence suggests that target firm shareholders do not free-ride. Evidence is also provided indicating that premiums are paid by the majority holder to acquire a remaining minority interest.     

Financial comparability and environmental diversity: an international context

Accounting and environmental management both hold improved resource‐use efficiency as an ultimate goal, but intermediate processes and objectives vary and consequently it is separately assessed within each discipline. This paper intends to make visible the globalizing trends in accounting practice, which aim to standardize financial reporting to produce comparable information so that shareholders can maximize their economic wealth. This paper seeks to contrast this comparability strategy with the apparent need for diversity in accounting information exhibited by actual accounting practices, the information needs of environmental management and, ultimately, the cultural needs of sustainable development. We argue that a more pluralistic model, that enables a holistic assessment of corporate performance and balances diverse stakeholder objectives, is better suited to an uncertain future. Implementation requires accountants and environmental managers jointly to create and test a new order of reporting. There are many practical challenges but most significantly accountants and environmental managers must combine to enhance the visibility and credibility of these diverse performance measures. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment